On the distribution and adoption of genetically modified seeds in developing countries by Basu, Arnab & Qaim, Matin
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 03/2004 
 
 
On the Distribution and Adoption of Genetically 
Modified Seeds in Developing Countries 
 
Arnab K. Basu1 and Matin Qaim2 
 
1 College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA, USA 
2 University of Hohenheim, Stuttgart, Germany 
 
 
 
Forschung zur Entwicklungsökonomie und -politik 
Research in Development Economics and Policy 
 
 
Universität Hohenheim - Tropenzentrum 
Institut für Agrar- und Sozialökonomie 
in den Tropen und Subtropen 
 
University of Hohenheim – Centre for Agriculture in the 
Tropics and Subtropics 
Institute of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences  
in the Tropics and Subtropics 
  
Arnab K. Basu and Matin Qaim: 
On the Distribution and Adoption of Genetically Modified Seeds in Developing Countries. 
Institute of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences in the Tropics and Subtropics (Ed.), 
Forschung zur Entwicklungsökonomie und -politik – Research in Development Economics 
and Policy, Discussion Paper No. 03/2004. 
 
ISSN 1439-4952 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2004 Institut für Agrar- und Sozialökonomie in den Tropen und Subtropen 
Universität Hohenheim (490), 70593 Stuttgart, Germany 
E-mail: dp490@uni-hohenheim.de 
All rights reserved. 
 
Printed in Germany. 
Druck: F. u. T. Müllerbader GmbH 
 Forststr. 18, 70794 Filderstadt, Germany 
 
VERLAG ULRICH E. GRAUER 
Linsenhofer Str. 44, 72660 Beuren, Germany 
Tel.: +49 (0)7025 842140, Fax: +49 (0)7025 842499 
Internet: http://www.grauer.de/, E-mail: grauer@grauer.de 
  
Centre for Agriculture in the Tropics and Subtropics 
Institute of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences 
in the Tropics and Subtropics 
• Department of Agricultural Development Theory and Policy (490a) 
• Department of International Agricultural Trade and Food Security 
(490b) 
• Department of Farming and Rural Systems (490c) 
• Josef G. Knoll-Visiting Professor for Development Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion papers in this series are intended to stimulate discussion among 
researchers, practitioners and policy makers. The papers mostly reflect 
work in progress. They have been reviewed internally by at least two 
colleagues of the institute. 
 
 
 
 
The authors thank Amitrajeet Batabyal, Nancy Chau, Douglas Gollin, Raja 
Kali and seminar participants at the International Atlantic Economic 
Society Conference – Lisbon, Northeast Universities Development 
Economics Consortium Meeting – Yale University and 75 Years of 
Development Economics Conference – Cornell University for helpful 
comments and suggestions. Qaim gratefully acknowledges financial support 
of the German Research Foundation (DFG). The usual disclaimer applies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  i
Table of Contents 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... ii 
1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 
2 Empirical Evidence ............................................................................................................. 5 
3 Basic Model ........................................................................................................................ 6 
4 Monopolist Supplier of GM Seeds and Optimal Intervention in 
 the Traditional Seed Market.............................................................................................. 10 
5 Transfers............................................................................................................................ 21 
6 Conclusion......................................................................................................................... 23 
References ................................................................................................................................ 25 
Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 27 
Tables and Figures ................................................................................................................... 29 
 
 
 
  ii
 
Abstract 
Given the proprietary nature of most genetically modified (GM) seed technologies, the 
question arises as to how farmers in developing countries can gain proper access to these 
innovations. Based on empirical observations, a theoretical model is developed which focuses 
on farmers’ adoption decisions in response to the pricing strategies of a foreign patent holder 
and the government. If the government is able to commit to the announced policy, subsidizing 
the use of traditional seeds can increase coverage of GM technology and domestic welfare. 
The possibility of the government obtaining a license to distribute GM seeds domestically 
through a transfer to the monopolist is also considered. 
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On the Distribution and Adoption of Genetically
Modified Seeds in Developing Countries
Arnab K. Basu∗ and Matin Qaim†
1 Introduction
Most developing countries traditionally rely on public sector research for agricultural
innovation. Internationally, however, the private sector is gaining in importance. New
biotechnological breakthroughs and strengthened intellectual property rights (IPRs) have
increased the incentives for corporate investments, while public support for agriculture
has been declining (Pray and Umali-Deininger, 1998). Especially research and devel-
opment (R & D) in the area of genetically modified (GM) crops are largely dominated
by a few multinational companies. There is concern that biotechnology will bypass the
developing world or, worse, that poor farmers might be exploited by foreign monopolist
seed suppliers. Hence, the question as to how developing countries can ensure proper
access to proprietary innovations is of central policy relevance (Evenson, 2004; Byerlee
and Fischer, 2002; FAO, 2004).
Recent empirical studies demonstrate that GM crops can be beneficial for farmers in de-
veloping countries. Pray et al. (2002) show for cotton in China, and Qaim and Traxler
(in press) for soybeans in Argentina, that these technologies can bring about major cost
savings in pest control and reduce negative environmental externalities through reduc-
tions in the use of toxic pesticides. Studies by Qaim and Zilberman (2003) and Thirtle
et al. (2003) reveal that GM crops can also increase yields in situations where pesticides
are underused. For most of these early GM applications in developing countries, farmers’
technology access was not a problem, because IPRs were not existent or not eﬀectively
enforced. Thus, monopoly power by foreign innovators was limited, and GM seed prices
remained aﬀordable. Corporate profit potentials are small, however, and it is unlikely
that companies will commercialize their seed technologies on a larger scale under such
conditions. Private incentive structures in developing countries will have to be improved
∗Department of Economics, College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187. E-mail: ak-
basu@wm.edu. Tel: (757) 221-1318. Fax: (757) 221-1175.
†Department of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences, University of Hohenheim, 70593
Stuttgart, Germany. Email: qaim@uni-hohenheim.de. Tel: 49-711-459-2784. Fax: 49-711-459-3762.
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through a higher level of IPR protection or other mechanisms to ensure a sustained in-
flow of proprietary innovations.1 Member countries of the World Trade Organization are
required to strengthen their IPRs under the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs) agreement.
With stronger IPRs, prices of GM seeds will rise, thus deterring certain farmers from
using them. Qaim and de Janvry (2003) showed for Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) cotton in
Argentina that the high monopoly seed price is a major barrier to adoption, especially for
smallholder farmers. In such situations, the developing country government might want
to intervene, in order to increase technology coverage and domestic welfare. This paper
examines the optimal form of intervention in seed markets of developing economies. A
theoretical model is developed, focusing on the adoption decision by agricultural produc-
ers in response to the pricing strategies by the patent holder of the GM seed technology
and the government of the adopting country. We show that, in a scenario where IPR
infringement is a non-issue and where GM seeds are priced higher than the traditional
counterpart, the optimal form of intervention is to subsidize the price of traditional seeds.
This counter-intuitive result follows from recognizing the fact that GM and traditional
seeds are (imperfect) substitutes as inputs in production. Subsequently, lowering the
price of traditional seeds forces the monopolist GM seed supplier to reduce the price of
GM seeds in order to preserve market share.
The existing theoretical literature on pricing decisions of the GM patent holder and the
subsequent adoption decisions by farmers has focused on two issues: (i) the incentives
for R & D to develop GM seeds (Weaver and Kim, 2002) and (ii) the eﬀect of IPR
enforcement on pricing and adoption decisions (Giannakas, 2002; Chattopadhyay and
Horbulyk, 2003). Weaver and Kim identify a key element in the pricing decision for GM
seeds by a foreign monopolist: the patent holder of the GM technology is a restrictive
monopolist in the sense that the range of its pricing power is contingent on the incentives
for other technologies (e.g., traditional seeds and chemical regimes). Given this limited
monopoly power, and under imperfect information regarding production conditions on
the part of the patent holder, Weaver and Kim show that uniform pricing of GM seeds
results in the appropriation of large parts of the benefits by the adopters.
1Also, public R & D investments will have to be expanded to address private research gaps. But the
focus of this paper is on proprietary GM technologies.
2
In terms of IPRs, Giannakas postulates that complete deterrence of IPR infringement
may not be optimal from the standpoint of the adopting country’s welfare. Given that
the patent holder is a restrictive monopolist, lax IPR enforcement pushes the monopolist
to reduce the price of GM seeds in order to ensure positive rents. The lower price of
GM seeds, in turn, enhances domestic welfare. Chattopadhyay and Horbulyk extend Gi-
annakas’ argument by incorporating explicitly the notion that GM technology confers a
negative externality on the adopting country. Given this negative externality Chattopad-
hyay and Horbulyk show that a corrective tax on the price of GM seeds or a subsidy
to the use of traditional seeds is consistent with welfare maximization of the adopt-
ing country. Either of these two policies reduce coverage of GM seeds in their model.
However, worrying negative externalities, be it adverse impacts on the environment or
consumer health, have not been shown in risk analyses related to the GM technologies
commercialized up till now. On the contrary, hitherto applications of GM technologies
in the small farm sector of developing countries resulted in substantial economic, social,
and environmental benefits. Our purpose is to build a model that incorporates realistic
features of GM seed adoption in developing countries, in order to extrapolate policy rec-
ommendations that favor increased coverage of GM seeds and enhanced domestic welfare.
As a starting point, we ignore the possibility of IPR infringement and any externalities
subsequent upon the decision to adopt GM seeds. We follow Weaver and Kim in the
sense that the supplier of GM seeds acts as a restrictive monopolist due to the existence
of a competing traditional seed market which imposes an upper bound on the price that
the monopolist can charge. This latter observation provides the key in analyzing how
policy-makers in developing countries can best intervene in the agricultural sector to
ensure that welfare of the economy is maximized. We consider a small open economy
in the absence of labeling (thus ruling out the possibility of an output-price diﬀerential)
where the government intervenes by maximizing the sum of producers’ surplus and net
revenue from the sale of traditional seeds to determine the optimal form of intervention.
Subsequent upon the form of intervention we focus on the coverage of GM seeds within
the economy. In doing so, we account for two crucial elements. First, whether or not
the monopolist GM seed supplier has perfect information regarding the production con-
ditions within the economy. If the monopolist has imperfect information then GM seeds
are priced uniformly, while perfect information allows the monopolist to pursue first-
degree price discrimination. Second, whether or not the government is credible and can
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therefore commit to its announced form of intervention. This is particularly important
since the monopolist rationally accounts for the possibility that the announced policy
may be time-inconsistent in its pricing decision for GM seeds.
The basic framework explores a sequential game a` la Giannakas, between the foreign
monopolist supplier and the government to determine the prices of GM and traditional
seeds. Depending on whether the monopolist has perfect or imperfect information, the
domestic government as the first mover announces the optimal form of intervention in
the traditional seed market by maximizing producers’ surplus. Subsequently, the mo-
nopolist, by accounting for the possibility that the government’s announced policy might
be time-inconsistent, sets the price of GM seeds. Lastly, the heterogeneous producers
self-select into the usage of either GM or traditional seeds. In both the perfect and
imperfect information scenarios, we find that, if the domestic government can credibly
commit to the announced policy, the optimal form of intervention entails subsidizing the
use of traditional seeds. Our findings are in contrast to observed practices in developing
countries like Mexico that are known to subsidize the price of GM seeds (cf. Traxler et
al., 2001).
Finally, we consider the possibility of the government obtaining the ownership right to
distribute GM seeds domestically through a lump-sum royalty, that is, a transfer to
the patent holder. The foreign company would only agree to such an arrangement, if
the transfer compensates for the foregone monopoly rent, while for the government the
prerequisite would be that domestic welfare be increased. We show that, under uni-
form pricing of GM seeds, there exists a positive transfer from the government to the
monopolist that leads to a higher level of domestic welfare by allowing the government
to practice marginal cost pricing for both GM and traditional seeds. However, when
the monopolist can practice perfect discrimination, the possibility of a strictly welfare
improving transfer does not exist.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in the next section we use the empirical example
of Bt cotton in Argentina to show that there is indeed a positive correlation between
traditional seed prices and farmers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for GM seeds. This asso-
ciation supports the assumption of a restrictive monopoly, which is key for the analytical
results. In the following sections, the basic theoretical model is developed, and the pric-
4
ing strategies of GM and traditional seeds are explored under the perfect and imperfect
information scenarios. Then, the issue of transfers is analyzed, and the last section
concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
Insect-resistant Bt cotton has been commercialized in a number of countries, and, due to
weak IPR protection, adoption has mostly been very fast and widespread. However, in
Argentina Bt cotton technology is patented, and GM seeds are marketed by a monopolist
supplier. Motivated by the relatively low adoption rates in Argentina, Qaim and de
Janvry (2003) analyzed the farmers’ WTP for Bt cotton seeds and the expected level
of demand under diﬀerent pricing regimes. They used a double-bounded contingent
valuation approach and survey data collected in Argentina in 2001. For econometric
estimation, the following log-likelihood function was employed:
lnL =
n3
i=1
IU ln[1−φ(P
U − βIν
σ
)]+IULln[φ(
PU − βIν
σ
)−φ(P
L − β Iν
σ
)]+ILln[φ(
PL − βIν
σ
)]
where PU is the upper-bound and PL the lower-bound price bid from the contingent
valuation survey. IU , IUL, and IL are indicator variables for respondents with a WTP
above PU , between PU and PL, and below PL, respectively. ν is a vector of farm-specific
variables influencing the WTP, and βI is the vector of coeﬃcients to be estimated. These
coeﬃcients can directly be interpreted as marginal eﬀects.
Qaim and de Janvry showed a significant influence of various demographic, agro-ecological
and institutional characteristics on the WTP for Bt cotton, but they did not include the
price of traditional seeds as an explanatory variable. We use the same model and data
for testing our hypothesis that the price for traditional seeds is positively correlated with
the WTP for GM seeds. Since Argentine cotton farmers obtain their traditional seeds
from a variety of formal and informal sources, there is suﬃcient price variation in the
sample for robust estimates. The summary statistics of the explanatory variables and
the estimation results are shown in Table 1.
Unsurprisingly, larger and better educated farmers have a higher WTP for Bt cotton,
whereas a credit constraint has a negative eﬀect. The coeﬃcient for the traditional
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seed price is positive and significant.2 Every additional dollar that a farmer spends on
buying traditional cotton seeds increases his WTP for Bt seeds by almost 1.5 dollars.
This suggests that a subsidy in the traditional seed market should indeed induce the
profit-maximizing GM seed supplier to reduce its monopoly price, thus corroborating the
theoretical findings presented in later sections. Producers who face higher expenditures
for chemical insecticides also have a higher WTP for Bt technology. Since there is
usually a positive correlation between insect infestation and the extent of insecticide
use, the variable insecticide expenditure can be seen as a proxy for pest pressure. Pest
pressure varies between farmers according to agroecological conditions at the micro level.
The higher the pest pressure, the more beneficial Bt technology will be for a farmer, a
result which is used to model GM technology in our theoretical framework.
3 Basic Model
The model we consider has three groups or agents: (i) the monopolist GM seed supplier;
(ii) producers who self-select into either of two groups – user of GM seeds or traditional
ones and (iii) the government of the developing economy which undertakes the twin role
of procuring traditional seeds from perfectly competitive traditional seed suppliers and
selling them to the adopters of traditional seeds as well as maximizing the welfare of its
constituents via the choice of the optimal form of intervention in the seed market. In
essence we have in mind an economy where traditional better quality seeds are sold to
adopters through an agency like the seed marketing board.
The economy we consider has N total producers. There are two types of technologies
available to an individual producer in the economy: traditional and GM seeds. GM seeds
are sold by a foreign monopolist, and either guarantee the same level of output with a
relatively lower use of pesticide (and hence lower input costs) or a higher level of output
with the same intensity of pesticide usage, as compared to traditional seeds.
The technological specification for crops produced via traditional seed use is given by
Qt = F (y) +G(x)−Di (1)
2Since farmers choose their seed source, the traditional seed price might be associated with an
endogeneity problem. However, leaving the variable out only has minor eﬀects on the other estimates,
and the coeﬃcients are very similar to those in Qaim and de Janvry (2003). We therefore conclude that
the seed price variable does not cause a systematic bias.
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where Qt is the output from using traditional seeds; y is the level of a composite non-
pesticide input while x is the level of pesticide input. The functions F () and G() are
concave and twice diﬀerentiable. The parameter Di is producer specific and captures the
extent of pest pressure on the land. D follows a uniform distribution over the interval
[0, 1] with an associated density function σ(D) > 0 and a cumulative distribution func-
tion Σ(D). Thus, higher values of D capture increasing pest pressure.3
On the other hand, the technology available for production via GM seeds is given by
Qg = F (y) +G(x+ δ)− αDi (2)
where Qg is the output from using GM seeds while y and x are, once again, the com-
posite non-pesticide and pesticide inputs respectively. δ > 0 is a shift parameter that
captures the fact that the use of GM yields a higher level of output with the same level
of pesticide use. Finally, 0 < α < 1 signifies that the damage to crops under GM seed
usage is lower as compared to the use of traditional ones. In other words, α is negatively
correlated with the GM technology’s eﬀectiveness to control pest damage. Note also
that α is identical across producers in the sense that all producers are able to reduce the
damage to their crops by the same proportion via the use of GM seeds.
Although producers diﬀer according to pest pressure on their lands, we assume that they
are endowed with identical plot size T . Therefore, if sg and st are the seed requirements
per unit acre for GM and traditional crops respectively, then each producer requires Tsg
and Tst amount of seeds. For analytical simplicity, we normalize T to be unity. Further,
in concert with empirical evidence indicating that the land-seed ratio is the same irre-
spective of whether GM or traditional seeds are planted, we henceforth set sg = st = s.
With the technological specifications in place, we start with the derivation of the input
demand functions for pesticides and the composite input for the two types of seed users.
Ruling out the scenario in which there is partial adoption on a producer’s plot, we denote
πt as the profit of a traditional seed user. Therefore,
πt = PQt − pts− pxx− pyy = P [F (y) +G(x)−Di]− pts− pxx− pyy
3GM crops available up till now facilitate pest management in farmers’ fields. For non-pest-related
GM technologies, which might be commercialized in the future, D can also represent any other charac-
teristic causing heterogeneity among farmers (e. g., land quality).
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where P is the price per unit output of the traditional crop; pt is the price per unit of
traditional seeds while px and py are per-unit prices of the pesticide and the composite
non-pesticide input respectively. Maximizing πt with respect to x and y yields,
∂πt
∂y
= PF I(y)− py = 0⇒ y∗ = f(
py
P
)
∂πt
∂x
= PGI(x)− px = 0⇒ x∗ = g(
px
P
)
Substituting for y∗ and x∗ into the profit function yields
πt = P [F (y∗) +G(x∗)−Di]− pts− pxx∗ − pyy∗ (3)
= P [F (f(
py
P
)) +G(g(
px
P
))−Di]− pts− pxg(
px
P
)− pyf(
py
P
)
Similarly, profit of a producer who opts for GM seeds is given by πg, where
πg = PQg − pgs− pxx− pyy = P (F (y) +G(x+ δ)− αDi)− pgs− pxx− pyy
P is the price of the output produced via GM. We assume that the output price of
GM and traditional crops are identical as there exists no clear evidence on any price
diﬀerential between the two. Maximizing profit of a GM seed user we have
∂πg
∂y
= PF I(y)− py = 0⇒ y∗ = f(
py
P
)
∂πg
∂x
= PGI(x+ δ)− px = 0⇒ x∗ = g(
px
P
)− δ
Substituting for y∗ and x∗ into the profit function yields
πg = P [F (y∗) +G(x∗ + δ)− αDi]− pgs− pxx∗ − pyy∗ (4)
= P [F (f(
py
P
)) +G(g(
px
P
)− δ + δ)− αDi]− pgs− px[g(
px
P
)− δ]− pyf(
py
P
)
From the above set-up it is easy to see that a producer endowed with land quality
D ∈ [0, 1] will choose to use GM seeds if and only if πg ≥ πt, or
P [F (f(
py
P
)) +G(g(
px
P
)− δ + δ)− αDi]− pgs− px[g(
px
P
)− δ]− pyf(
py
P
)
≥ P [F (f(py
P
)) +G(g(
px
P
))−Di]− pts− pxg(
px
P
)− pyf(
py
P
)
Normalizing the output price of traditional and GM crops to unity (i.e., P = 1) and
rearranging the above equation, we identify the marginal producer who is willing to
adopt GM seed as:
D¯ ≥ (pg − pt)s− pxδ
(1− α) (5)
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Therefore, equation (5) provides a cut-oﬀ point on the distribution of pest pressure on
land such that all producers with pest pressure greater than or equal to the critical level,
D¯, will self-select into the group that chooses to use GM seeds. In other words, the
higher is the pest pressure (and hence the greater the damage under traditional seed
use), the more likely it is that a producer will opt for GM seeds. Thus, the number of
producers who opt for traditional seeds is NΣ(D¯) while the number of producers who
opt for GM seeds is N [1− Σ(D¯)].
Equation (5) above also allows us to check for the response of the marginal producer (and
hence the total number of producers who opt for GM seeds) to changes in the various
parameters. For instance, and as should be expected, an increase in the price of GM
seeds (pg) decreases the number of producers who opt for GM while an increase in the
price of traditional seeds (pt) shifts the number of producers in favor of GM. Second,
an increase in the price of the pesticide input (px) increases the number of producers
who adopt GM seeds, as the latter requires a lower use of pesticides to generate the
same output. Third, the intensity of seed requirement per unit of land plays a role in
the number of producer who self-select into the use of GM in the sense that the higher
the seed requirement the lower is the number of producers who use GM, as long as GM
seeds are costlier than their traditional counterparts. Finally, and obviously, the lower
the damage from planting GM seeds (lower the value of α) the larger is the number of
producers willing to adopt GM seeds.
Simple manipulation of equation (5) also allows us to identify an individual producers’
WTP for GM seeds, pig. Specifically,
pig =
(1− α)Di
s
+
pxδ
s
+ pt (6)
From equation (6) above, the WTP for GM seeds is is positively related to the pest
pressure on land. Additionally, the WTP rises with an increase in either (i) the price of
traditional seeds, pt, (ii) the price of the pesticide input, px and (iii) the degree by which
GM seeds reduce damage to crops (smaller α). These theoretical findings are consistent
with the empirical evidence reported in the previous section. On the other hand, WTP
for GM seeds falls with an increase in the seed requirement, as profits decline relatively
more in comparison with the profits under traditional seed use given that the price of GM
seeds is greater than the traditional ones. Figure I plots producers’ WTP as a function
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of pest pressure on land. All else constant, the higher the pest pressure the higher is the
WTP for GM seeds.
4 Monopolist Supplier of GM Seeds and Optimal
Intervention in the Traditional Seed Market
GM seeds are supplied by a foreign monopolist who can either price GM seeds uniformly
(under imperfect information) or act as a perfectly discriminating monopolist (under
perfect information). In this setting, the government of the developing country wants
to intervene in order to prevent excessive pricing, increase GM adoption, and maximize
domestic welfare. As was mentioned already, and as will be shown analytically below,
this can be achieved through a subsidy in the traditional seed market.4 We assume
the logical sequence that the government is the first mover in announcing whether it
chooses to intervene in the traditional seed market. After the government’s announce-
ment, the monopolist supplier announces the price of GM seeds (pg). Given these two
prices domestic producers self-select into the usage of GM and traditional seeds. How-
ever, if the government is not credible then it cannot commit to the announced form of
intervention and consequently reneges after the monopolist announces the price of GM
seeds. Under rational expectation on the part of the monopolist, the problem of time-
inconsistency is incorporated ex-ante in the profit maximizing calculus and hence in the
pricing of GM seeds. Thus, for both the pricing scenarios for the monopolist (uniform
and discriminatory), we consider the first and second-best regimes (respectively, when
the government credibly commits to the announced form of intervention and when the
government reneges), in the determination of the adoption decision by domestic pro-
ducers and consequently coverage of GM seeds. We start with the case of asymmetric
information on the part of the monopolist, or uniform pricing.
Uniform Pricing of GM Seeds
4In some cases, a formal market for traditional seeds might not exist, because farmers exclusively
use farm-saved seeds or informal sources, so that a seed subsidy would not be practicable. Yet, such
locations are hardly targeted by foreign GM seed companies anyway. For a subsidy to work it is not
necessary that farmers buy seeds in formal markets every single growing season. Even if they buy fresh
seeds only occasionally, a government intervention in the traditional market would influence their WTP
for GM seeds and thus the pricing strategy of the monopolist.
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In the event where the monopolist has imperfect information regarding the distribution
of D, the per-unit price of GM seeds is invariant to pest pressure.
Let pet denote the price of traditional seeds that the foreign monopolist and the producers
expect the government of the developing economy to charge. In this case, the cut-oﬀ on
the distribution of pest pressure (from equation (5)) that determines the self-selection of
producers between GM and traditional seed use is given by
D¯u ≡
(pg − pet )s
(1− α) −
pxδ
(1− α) (7)
Given the demand for GM seeds N
$D+
D¯u
sdΣ(D) = N
$D+
D¯u
s
D+
dD, and the marginal cost
of producing GM seeds as w, a uniform pricing monopolist’s profit is given by
Πu(pg, pet) = N
8 D+
D¯u
(pg − w)s
D+
dD
As shown in Appendix I, by substituting for D¯u from equation (7) into the first order
condition of profit maximization with respect to pg, the best-response function of the
monopolist can be derived as
pg(p
e
t ) =
1
2
X
(1− α)D+
s
+ (pet + w) +
pxδ
s
~
(8)
Figure II plots the best response function of the foreign monopolist engaged in uniform
pricing. The lineMM represents the function pg(p
e
t ) with intercept
1
2
p
(1−α)D+
s
+ w + pxδ
s
Q
and slope 1
2
.
The iso-profit contours of the monopolist can, in turn, be derived from
dΠu =
N
D+
s
X
D+ − [ (pg − p
e
t )s− pxδ
(1− α) ]−
(pg − w)s
(1− α)
~
dpg +
N
D+
s
(pg − w)s
(1− α) dp
e
t = 0
which implies that
dpet
dpg
= −
(1−α)
s
D+ + pxδ
s
+ pet + w − 2pg
(pg − w)
and
d2pet
d(pg)2
=
(1−α)
s
[D+ − D¯u]
(pg − w)2
> 0
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Thus, the iso-profit contours of the monopolist, UU in Figure II, are convex to the origin
and since
dΠu
dpet
=
N
D+
s2
(1− α)(pg − w) > 0,
higher iso-profit curves imply higher profits for the monopolist.
First-Best Regime: We start with the first-best regime where the domestic government
has credibility and hence sets, via intervention, the price of traditional seeds as pt = p
e
t .
Thus, substituting for pg from equation (8) into equation (7) and equating pt = p
e
t , we
have
D¯u ≡
1
2
X
D+ − (pt − w)s
(1− α) −
pxδ
(1− α)
~
(9)
Noting from the above equation that dD¯u
dpt
= 1
2
s
(1−α) and taking into account the positive
relationship between the price of GM seeds and the price of traditional seeds (dpg
dpt
= 1
2
),
the domestic government maximizes the sum of total producers’ surplus and the net
revenue from the sale of traditional seeds under uniform pricing by the monopolist (Vu)
in order to determine the optimal price of traditional seeds. Or,
max
pt
Vu = N
8 D+
D¯u
πgdΣ(D) +N
8 D¯u
0
πtdΣ(D) +N
8 D¯u
0
(pt − z)sdΣ(D)
where N
$D+
D¯u
πgdΣ(D) is the total surplus of producers using GM seeds; N
$ D¯u
0 πtdΣ(D)
is the total surplus of producers using traditional seeds and N
$ D¯u
0 (pt − z)sdΣ(D) is the
net revenue of the government from selling traditional seeds. z is the marginal cost of
producing traditional seeds, and with perfectly competitive traditional seed suppliers, z is
also the procurement cost incurred by the government. The marginal costs of traditional
and GM seed production depend on where and under what conditions seed production
takes place. If produced under identical conditions, w might be equal to z. However,
since the distribution of GM seeds is associated with additional marginal costs, such as
extension and monitoring eﬀorts, it is fair to assume that w > z in most cases. Note that
the net revenue of the government satisfies the budget constraint, NΣ(D)[pt−z]s+T = 0,
where T is the lump-sum non-distortionary tax imposed on the constituents if pt < z or
a lump-sum subsidy that is redistributed if pt > z.
Since
πt = F (y∗) +G(x∗)−Di − pts− pxx∗ − pyy∗
πg = F (y∗) +G(x∗)− αDi − pgs− pxx∗ − pyy∗ + pxδ
12
we denote F (y∗) + G(x∗) − pxx∗ − pyy∗ = Ω. Thus, national welfare maximization for
the developing economy entails,
max
pt
Vu = N
8 D+
D¯u
p
Ω− αDi − pgs+ pxδ
Q
dΣ(D) +N
8 D¯u
0
p
Ω−Di − pts
Q
dΣ(D)
+N
8 D¯u
0
(pt − z)sdΣ(D)
As derived in detail in Appendix II, the first order condition associated with the above
problem, evaluated for the marginal producer of GM (D¯u), is given by
(D+ − D¯u)(1− α)
s
= z − pt
Since the left hand side of the above equation is positive, the optimal pricing strategy
for traditional seeds by the domestic government involves pricing traditional seeds below
their associated marginal cost, or a subsidy to the per-unit price of traditional seeds.
By substituting for D¯u from equation (9) we solve for the price of traditional seeds as
pt =
2
3
z +
1
3
w − 1
3
D+(1− α)
s
− 1
3
pxδ
s
(10)
and substituting this value of pt into equation (8) (the best-response function of the
monopolist) we solve for the price of GM seeds as
pg =
1
3
D+(1− α)
s
+
2
3
w +
1
3
z +
1
3
pxδ
s
(11)
Given the values of pg and pt, the number of producers who use GM seeds under the
first-best regime (credible domestic government) is given as, N [1− Σ(D¯Cu )] with
D¯Cu =
2
3
D+ +
1
3
(w − z)s
(1− α) −
1
3
pxδ
(1− α) (12)
Finally the optimal per-unit price subsidy, φCu , on traditional seeds is given by
φCu = (z − pt) =
1
3
X
D+(1− α)
s
− (w − z) + pxδ
s
~
(13)
The subsidy increases with an increase in either px or z and decreases with an increase
in w. An increase in px has two eﬀects that both benefit the monopolist supplier of GM
seeds: (i) it increases the number of producers who opt for GM seed usage which, in
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turn, lowers the demand for traditional seeds and has an adverse impact on government
revenue and (ii) increases the WTP of domestic producers for GM seeds, thus allowing
the monopolist to extract a larger surplus. The government being the first-mover, pre-
empts this possibility by skewing the incentives for domestic producers towards the use of
traditional seeds via a subsidy. An increase in the marginal cost of producing traditional
seeds has the eﬀect of raising the price of traditional seeds thereby increasing demand
for GM seeds and allowing the monopolist to extract a larger surplus. Conversely, a
higher marginal cost of producing GM seeds implies that the price per-unit of GM seed
is higher for the marginal producer who finds it relatively beneficial to use traditional
seeds. Further, from equation (13), a large range of pest pressure, (D+ − 0), translates
into both a higher number of producers opting for GM seed as well as a higher WTP for
GM seeds, which again entails a higher level of subsidy to curb the monopolist’s profit.
On the other hand, a higher seed requirement lowers the WTP for GM seeds for all
producers as input costs rise. In this case – a lower number of GM seed users and a
lower WTP for GM seeds – require a lower level of subsidy.
We now turn to the derivation of the iso-welfare contours for the government. Note that
dVu = −
N
D+
s[D+ − D¯u]dpg −
1
2
N
D+
s
X
[D+ − D¯u] + (pt − z)
s
(1− α)
~
dpt = 0
Therefore,
dpg
dpt
= −1
2
[D+ − D¯u] + (pt − z) s(1−α)
[D+ − D¯u]
= −1
2
X
1 +
(pt − z)
[D+ − D¯u]
s
(1− α)
~
Thus,
dpg
dpt



> 0 if (pt−z)
[D+−D¯u]
s
(1−α) < −1
= 0 if (pt−z)
[D+−D¯u]
s
(1−α) = −1
< 0 if pt ≥ z
In Figure II the curves V V plot the iso-welfare contours of the developing economy. Note
from above that since ∂Vu
∂pt
< 0 lower iso-welfare curves denote a higher level of welfare for
the developing economy.5 Under the first best regime, equilibrium is attained at point
5
dVu
dpt
= −1
2
N
D+
s
w
[D+ − D¯u] + (pt − z)
s
(1− α)
W
< 0.
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X where the monopolist’s best-response function is tangent to the iso-welfare curve V o,
with (z − pt) = φCu as the per-unit level of subsidy to traditional seeds.6
Second-Best Regime: We now consider the optimal prices of GM and traditional
seeds when the government’s announcement of pt lacks credibility. In other words, the
government reneges on pt after the monopolist has announced pg. Let ψ(pet) be the
price of traditional seeds announced by the government if the monopolist and domestic
producers believe that pet is the price that the government will eventually set. Given,
D¯u ≡
(pg − pet )s
(1− α) −
pxδ
(1− α)
The government maximizes
max
ψ(pet )
Vu = N
8 D+
D¯u
p
Ω− αDi − pg(pet )s+ pxδ
Q
dΣ(D) +N
8 D¯u
0
p
Ω−Di − ψ(pet )s
Q
dΣ(D)
+N
8 D¯u
0
(ψ(pet )− z)sdΣ(D)
under the assumption that pg(ψ(pet )) is constant. The first order condition associated
with the above maximization problem yields,
∂Vu
∂ψ(pet)
eeepg(ψ(pet ))=const = −N
(ψ(pet )− z)
D+
s
dD¯u
dψ(pet )
= 0
or ψ(pet) = pt = z. Therefore, in the event that the government cannot commit to the
announced price, traditional seeds are priced at their associated marginal cost. Given
rational expectations on the part of the monopolist, the price of GM seeds for the pro-
ducers is derived from the best-response function of the monopolist by substituting for
pet = z. Therefore,
pg =
1
2
X
(1− α)D+
s
+ (z + w) +
pxδ
s
~
(14)
Figure III depicts the equilibrium when the government cannot commit to the announced
price of traditional seeds. In the bottom quadrant of the Figure, the 45o line equates
6Point X captures the fact that the slope of the iso-welfare curve equals the slope of the monopolist’s
best-response function, i.e.,
dpg
dpt
= −1
2
w
1 +
(pt − z)
[D+ − D¯u]
s
(1− α)
W
=
1
2
=
∂pg
∂pt
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pet = pt while the top quadrant captures the best-response function of the monopolist GM
seed supplier, (line MM). Note that point A captures the fact that domestic welfare is
maximized when traditional seeds are priced at marginal cost while point B determines
the price of GM seeds when traditional seeds are priced at marginal cost.
Substituting for pt = z and for pg from equation (14) into equation (7) determines
the number of producers who self-select to use GM seeds as N [1 − Σ(D¯NCu )] when the
government cannot credibly commit to the announced price of traditional seeds, where
D¯NCu =
1
2
X
D+ +
(w − z)s
(1− α) −
pxδ
(1− α)
~
(15)
Finally, from a comparison of equations (12) and (15), note that coverage of GM seeds
with a credible regime can still be higher than the coverage of a non-credible government.
The intuition follows from the fact that even though a higher price of traditional seeds
under a non-credible government leads more producers to opt for GM seeds – the best-
response function of the monopolist, wherein the price of GM seeds depends positively
on the price of traditional ones, dictates that the uniform price of GM seeds charged
by the monopolist is also higher. This second eﬀect may run contrary to the first and
reduce the incentive for producers to opt for GM seeds under a non-credible government.
Specifically, GM coverage of a credible government is greater when,
D¯Cu < D¯
NC
u ⇔
1
6
(w − z)s
(1− α) −
1
6
pxδ
(1− α) −
1
6
D+ > 0
a suﬃcient condition for which is either (i) (w − z)s is large or (ii) pxδ and the range of
pest pressure, (D+ − 0) are small.
Pricing of GM Seeds under Perfect Discrimination
In this sub-section we explore the situation where the monopolist has full information
about the producers, thus implementing perfect price discrimination. We make this
assumption for analytical purposes to demonstrate the extreme case. Due to prohibitive
transaction costs, perfect discrimination is not viable in reality. Yet, some form of
regional price discrimination has been practiced, e.g., for Bt cotton seeds in Mexico and
South Africa (Traxler et al., 2001; Gouse et al., 2003). If the monopolist supplier of GM
seeds has perfect information about the distribution of D then pg(D) varies positively
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with D. First, note that the marginal producer in this situation is determined by
D¯d =
(pg − pt)s
(1− α) −
pxδ
(1− α) ≡
(w − pt)s
(1− α) +
pxδ
(1− α)
since the lowest price charged by the perfectly discriminating monopolist (the price per-
unit of GM seeds charged to the marginal producer) equals the marginal cost of producing
GM seeds, w.
Given the demand for GM seeds, N
$D+
D¯d
sdΣ(D) = N
$D+
D¯d
s
D+
dD, a perfectly discrimi-
nating monopolist’s profit (Πd) is
Πd = N
8 D+
D¯d
X
(pg(D)− w)s
D+
~
dD
where D¯d denotes the pest pressure for the marginal producer who is just indiﬀerent
between the choice of GM and traditional seed use under perfect discrimination.
Once again, let pet be the expected price of traditional seeds that the monopolist and the
domestic producers expect the government to set. Given pet , the monopolist sets
pg(D, p
e
t ) =
D(1− α)
s
+
pxδ
s
+ pet (16)
∀D ∈ [D¯d, D+]. With the above observations, we now turn to the issue of optimal inter-
vention in the market for traditional seeds.
First-Best Regime: Suppose the government is credible and commits to the announced
price of traditional seeds. Thus, pt = p
e
t . Taking into account the positive relationship
between pg and pt (from equation (16)), the domestic government maximizes the sum of
total producer surplus (surplus of both GM and traditional seed users) and net revenue
from the sale of traditional seeds, Vd, by the choice of pt as:
max
pt
Vd = N
8 D+
D¯d
p
Ω− αDi − pg(D, pt)s+ pxδ
Q
dΣ(D) +N
8 D¯d
0
p
Ω−Di − pts
Q
dΣ(D)
+N
8 D¯d
0
(pt − z)sdΣ(D)
Where N
$D+
D¯d
(Ω− αDi − pg(D, pt)s+ pxδ) dΣ(D) is the total surplus of producers using
GM seeds; N
$ D¯d
0 (Ω−Di − pts) dΣ(D) is the total surplus of producers using traditional
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seeds and N
$ D¯d
0 (pt − z)sdΣ(D) is the net revenue from the sale of traditional seeds.
Substituting for pg(D) from equation (16) and noting that
∂D¯d
∂pt
= − s
(1−α) , the first order
condition associated with the above maximization problem (upon simplification) yields
(see Appendix III for a proof),
z − pt = (D+ − D¯d)
(1− α)
s
Since the right hand side is positive, the optimal form of intervention involves pricing
traditional seeds, once again, below their associated marginal cost. By substituting for
D¯d into the first order condition above, and rearranging yields
pt =
1
2
X
(z + w)− D
+(1− α)
s
− pxδ
s
~
Coverage of GM seeds when the government is credible is hence given by,
D¯Cd =
(pg − pt)s
(1− α) −
pxδ
(1− α) (17)
=
1
2
X
D+ +
(w − z)s
(1− α) −
pxδ
(1− α)
~
Similarly, from the first order condition of welfare maximization above, the optimal
subsidy to the per-unit price of traditional seeds by a credible government, φCd , is solved
as:
φCd = z − pt =
1
2
X
D+(1− α)
s
− (w − z) + pxδ
s
~
(18)
As should be evident from equation (18) the optimal price subsidy rises with (i) an
increase in px, (ii) an increase in the marginal cost of producing traditional seeds, (z)
and (iii) an increase in the range of pest pressure, (D+ − 0). On the other hand, φCd
decreases with an increase in (i) the marginal cost of producing GM seeds (w), and (ii)
seed requirement, (s). The intuition for these results is along the lines discussed for the
first-best regime under uniform pricing.
Second-Best Regime: Suppose that the domestic government reneges and refuses to
pay the subsidy. Let the price of traditional seeds without the subsidy equal p˜t > p
e
t .
Correspondingly, the marginal producer in this case is now determined by
D˜d =
(pg − p˜t)s
(1− α) −
pxδ
(1− α)
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It is easy to check that since p˜t > p
e
t ⇔ D˜d < D¯d. As Figure IV shows, [D¯d − D˜d]
fraction of producers shift to the use of GM seeds once the government reneges on its
announced price of traditional seeds. Thus for ∀D ∈ [D˜d, D¯d] the monopolist charges
pg(D, P˜t) =
D(1−α)
s
+ pxδ
s
+ p˜t. The demand for GM seeds for this group of producers
is given as N
$ D¯d
D˜d
sdΣ(D). Therefore, total seed demand for GM seeds, in the event the
domestic government is non-credible is given by,
N
8 D+
D¯d
sdΣ(D) +N
8 D¯d
D˜d
sdΣ(D)
And the monopolist’s profit is
Π˜d = N
8 D+
D¯d
X
(pg(D)− w)s
D+
~
dD +N
8 D¯d
D˜d
X
(pg(D)− w)s
D+
~
dD
We now turn to the government’s problem of choosing p˜t to maximize the sum of total
producer surplus and net revenue from the sale of traditional seeds, Vd,
max
p˜t
Vd = N
8 D+
D¯d
p
Ω− αDi − pg(D, pet )s+ pxδ
Q
dΣ(D)
+N
8 D¯d
D˜d
p
Ω− αDi − pg(D, p˜t)s+ pxδ
Q
dΣ(D)
+N
8 D˜d
0
p
Ω−Di − p˜ts
Q
dΣ(D) +N
8 D˜d
0
(p˜t − z)sdΣ(D)
where N
$D+
D¯d
(Ω− αDi − pg(D, pet)s+ pxδ) dΣ(D) is the total surplus of producers using
GM seeds; N
$ D¯d
D˜d
(Ω− αDi − pg(D, p˜t)s+ pxδ) dΣ(D) is the total surplus of producers
using GM seeds if the government reneges. Note that D˜d is variable and depends on the
government’s choice of p˜t. N
$ D˜d
0 (Ω−Di − p˜ts) dΣ(D) is the total surplus of producers
using traditional seeds and N
$ D˜d
0 (p˜t − z)sdΣ(D) is the net revenue from the sale of
traditional seeds. Substituting for pg(D, p˜t) and noting that
∂D˜d
∂p˜t
= − s
(1−α) , the first
order condition associated with the above maximization problem, upon simplification,
yields
dVd
dp˜t
=
(p˜t − pet )s
(1− α) +
(p˜t − z)s
(1− α) = 0
⇒ (p˜t − pet ) = −(p˜t − z)
⇒ p˜t = pet =
(pet + z)
2
Note that
(pet+z)
2
< (pet + z) if p
e
t > z and
(pet+z)
2
> (pet + z) if p
e
t < z. In either of these
cases, the optimal strategy is to price traditional seeds closer to the associated marginal
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cost, z. Thus, under rational expectation, p˜ = pet =
(pet+z)
2
⇒ pet = z. Substituting for
pt = z we have
D˜NCd =
(w − z)s
(1− α) −
pxδ
(1− α) (19)
Note from a comparison of equations (17) and (19), that coverage of GM is greater when
the government is credible, only if
D¯Cd < D˜
NC
d ⇔
1
2
X
(w − z)s
(1− α) −
pxδ
(1− α) −D
+
~
a suﬃcient condition for which is either (i) (w − z)s is large or (ii) pxδ and the range of
pest pressure, (D+ − 0) are small.
Furthermore, note that comparison of equations (13) and (18) shows that for a credible
government the optimal price subsidy to traditional seeds is greater when the monopolist
practices perfect discrimination as compared to when the monopolist prices uniformly,
since
φCd =
1
2
X
D+(1− α)
s
− (w − z) + pxδ
s
~
>
1
3
X
D+(1− α)
s
− (w − z) + pxδ
s
~
= φCu
Second, comparison of equations (12) and (17) shows that coverage of GM if the govern-
ment is credible and the monopolist practices perfect discrimination is lower as compared
to the case when the monopolist prices uniformly only if,
D¯Cu − D¯Cd =
1
6
X
D+ − (w − z)s
(1− α) +
pxδ
(1− α)
~
< 0
a suﬃcient condition for which is that is either (i) (w − z)s is large or (ii) pxδ and the
range of pest pressure, (D+ − 0) are small. Lastly, coverage of GM if the government is
non-credible and the monopolist practices perfect discrimination is lower as compared to
the case when the monopolist prices uniformly (comparison of equations (15) and (18)),
only if
D¯NCu − D˜NCd =
1
2
X
D+ − (w − z)s
(1− α) +
pxδ
(1− α)
~
< 0
a suﬃcient condition for which is is either (i) (w − z)s is large or (ii) pxδ and the range
of pest pressure, (D+ − 0) are small.
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5 Transfers
In this section we consider the pricing of GM and traditional seeds if the government
is able to obtain a license from the patent holder with the right to distribute GM seeds
domestically. Of course, the first question that arises is whether a positive transfer exists
from the government to the patent holder such that the licensor can be compensated for
the forgone monopoly rent, while still enabling domestic welfare gains. Furthermore, we
analyze how far the possibility of a transfer depends on whether the monopolist has im-
perfect or perfect information regarding the production conditions. We once again start
with the case where the monopolist has imperfect information and hence prices GM seeds
uniformly. In what follows, we shall only consider the case where the government does
not have discretionary power to intervene in the market for traditional seeds, and hence
traditional seeds are priced at marginal cost.
Let put and p
u
g denote the prices of traditional and GM seeds when the government does
not have the right to distribute GM domestically. We have then,
put = z
pug =
1
3
D+(1− α)
s
+
2
3
w +
1
3
z +
1
3
pxδ
s
and
D¯u =
(pg − pt)s
(1− α) −
pxδ
(1− α)
Now suppose that the government has the ownership of the right to sell GM seeds
domestically. Let the government in this case charge p∗g and p
∗
t respectively by maximizing
the welfare, V ∗, which equals the sum of producers’ surplus, the net revenue from the
sale of traditional seeds and the surplus from selling GM seeds to the domestic producers.
Thus,
max
p∗t ; p
∗
g
V ∗ = N
8 D+
D∗
p
Ω− αDi − p∗gs+ pxδ
Q
dΣ(D) +N
8 D∗
0
p
Ω−Di − p∗t s
Q
dΣ(D)
+N
8 D∗
0
(p∗t − z)sdΣ(D) +N
8 D+
D∗
(p∗g − w)sdΣ(D)
= Vu(p
∗
g, p
∗
t ) +Πu(p
∗
g, p
∗
t )
where
D∗ ≡
(p∗g − p∗t )s
(1− α) −
pxδ
(1− α)
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The first order conditions associated with the above maximization problem yields,
∂V ∗
∂p∗t
=
(p∗t − z)s
(D+
∂D∗
∂p∗t
−
(p∗g − w)s
D+
∂D∗
∂p∗t
= 0
∂V ∗
∂p∗g
=
(p∗t − z)s
D+
∂D∗
∂p∗g
−
(p∗g − w)s
D+
∂D∗
∂p∗g
= 0
which implies that p∗t = z and p
∗
g = w. Thus, the government will practice marginal cost
pricing for both GM and traditional seeds.
Since p∗g and p
∗
t maximizes V
∗ = Vu(p
∗
g = w, p
∗
t = z) + Πu(p
∗
g = w, p
∗
t = z) it must
be the case that V ∗ ≥ Vu(pug , put = z) + Πu(pug , put = z) or that V ∗ − Πu(pug , put =
z) ≥ Vu(pug , put = z). Consequently, welfare of the developing economy after transferring
ownership and repayment of monopoly profits is higher than the welfare of the economy
without transferring ownership.
Thus, T u ∈ [V ∗(p∗g = w, p∗t = z)− Πu(pug , put = z); Vu(pug , put = z)] identifies the range
within which the size of the transfer belongs.
We now turn to the possibility of transfers when the monopolist has perfect information
(perfect discrimination). Once again if the government has ownership to distribute GM
then p∗g and p
∗
t are selected via the optimization of,
max
p∗t ; p
∗
g
V ∗ = N
8 D+
D∗
p
Ω− αDi − p∗gs+ pxδ
Q
dΣ(D) +N
8 D∗
0
p
Ω−Di − p∗t s
Q
dΣ(D)
+N
8 D∗
0
(p∗t − z)sdΣ(D) +N
8 D+
D∗
(p∗g − w)sdΣ(D)
If the government sets p∗g = w and p
∗
t = z, then V
∗ above reduces to,
V ∗ = N
8 D+
D∗
p
Ω− αDi − ws+ pxδ
Q
dΣ(D) +N
8 D∗
0
p
Ω−Di − zs
Q
dΣ(D)
Now, consider the welfare of the developing economy when the monopolist is able to
perfectly price discriminate (Vd) with pg =
D(1−α)
s
+ pxδ
s
+ pt and pt = z. Thus,
max
p∗t
Vd = N
8 D+
D¯d
p
Ω− αDi − pgs+ pxδ
Q
dΣ(D) +N
8 D¯d
0
p
Ω−Di − pts
Q
dΣ(D)
+N
8 D¯d
0
(pt − z)sdΣ(D)
= N
8 D+
D¯d
p
Ω−Di − zs
Q
dΣ(D) +N
8 D¯d
0
p
Ω−Di − zs
Q
dΣ(D)
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On the other hand, the profit of the monopolist under perfect discrimination with pg =
D(1−α)
s
+ pxδ
s
+ pt and pt = z equals
Πd = N
8 D+
D¯d
(pg(D)− w)sdΣ(D)
= N
8 D+
D¯d
p
Ω− αDi − ws+ pxδ
Q
dΣ(D)−N
8 D+
D¯d
p
Ω−Di − zs
Q
dΣ(D)
Thus, if D¯d =
(w−z)s
(1−α) +
pxδ
(1−α) = D
∗, then
Vd(pg, pt = z) +Πd(pg, pt = z) = N
8 D+
D∗
p
Ω− αDi − ws+ pxδ
Q
dΣ(D)
+N
8 D∗
0
p
Ω−Di − zs
Q
dΣ(D)
≡ V ∗(p∗g = w, p∗t = z)
which shows that if the monopolist perfectly discriminates then V ∗ = Vd + Πd or V ∗ −
Πd ≡ Vd. There does not exist any positive transfer that leads to the welfare of the
developing economy being strictly better-oﬀ if the government buys the right of ownership
to distribute GM seeds domestically.
6 Conclusion
As opposed to the recent focus in the literature on the pricing of GM seeds contingent
upon the strength of IPR enforcement, we analyze the role governments can play in order
to ensure that the monopolist supplier of GM seeds is unable to extract a higher than
optimal surplus from domestic producers in the agrarian economy of developing coun-
tries. This is particularly relevant against the background of widespread public concerns
that poor farmers might be exploited through multinational companies.
We use the example of pest-resistant GM crops. By endogenizing the technology adop-
tion decision of heterogeneous producers, we emphasize not only the range of pricing
options for the government and the foreign monopolist but also the resulting technology
coverage. We show that the optimal form of intervention for the government wishing
to increase GM coverage and maximize domestic welfare is to subsidize the price of
traditional seeds. This counter-intuitive result follows from recognizing that GM and
traditional seeds are (imperfect) substitutes. Hence, lowering the price of traditional
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seeds forces the monopolist to reduce the price of GM seeds in order to preserve market
share. The optimal size of the traditional seed subsidy depends systematically on the (i)
intensity of seed usage (GM and traditional), (ii) marginal cost of GM and traditional
seeds, (iii) price of chemical pesticides, (iv) degree to which GM seeds increase produc-
tivity, and (v) range of pest pressure among farmers.
We also identify a set of conditions under which coverage of GM can be evaluated for
the two information cases. For instance, if the seed requirement per unit of land or the
diﬀerence between the marginal costs of producing GM and traditional seeds are large
and/or the price of the pesticide input and the range of pest pressure on land are small
then (i) coverage of GM under a credible intervention through a subsidy to traditional
seeds is higher irrespective of whether the monopolist practices uniform or discriminatory
pricing, as compared to the situation where traditional seeds are priced at marginal cost
and (ii) coverage of GM under uniform pricing by the monopolist is higher as compared
to the case where the monopolist can price-discriminate irrespective of whether the gov-
ernment can credibly intervene in the domestic seed market. Nonetheless, our findings
pinpoint time-inconsistency of government policies as a possible reason for sub-optimal
coverage of GM seeds in developing countries.
Finally, we consider the option of the government obtaining the ownership right to dis-
tribute GM seeds domestically through a transfer to the monopolist. Under uniform
pricing of GM seeds, there exists a transfer that leads to a higher level of domestic
welfare by allowing the government to practice marginal cost pricing for both GM and
traditional seeds. However, when the monopolist can practice perfect discrimination, the
possibility of a strictly welfare improving transfer does not exist.
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Appendix
I. Best-Response function of the Monopolist under Uniform Pricing.
The monopolist’s profit maximization problem is given by
max
pg
Πu(pg, pet ) = N
8 D+
D¯u
(pg −w)s
D+
dD =
N
D+
(pg − w)s[D+ − D¯u]
Therefore,
dΠu
dpg
=
N
D+
(pg −w)s(−
dD¯u
dpg
) +
N
D+
s[D+ − D¯u] = 0
Since
D¯u ≡
(pg − pt)s
(1− α) −
pxδ
(1− α)
and dD¯udpg =
s
(1−α) , substituting above yields,
dΠu
dpg
=
N
D+
X
−2pgs2
(1− α) +D
+s+
ws2
(1− α) +
pts
2
(1− α) +
pxδs
(1− α)
~
= 0
which upon simplification yields
pg =
1
2
X
(1− α)D+
s
+ (pt + w) +
pxδ
s
~
II. Welfare Maximization under Uniform Pricing – First-Best Regime.
The welfare maximization problem of the developing country government is given by
max
pt
Vu = N
8 D+
D¯u
p
Ω− αDi − pgs+ pxδ
Q
dΣ(D) +N
8 D¯u
0
p
Ω−Di − pts
Q
dΣ(D)
+N
8 D¯u
0
(pt − z)sdΣ(D)
Therefore,
dVu
dpt
= N
8 D+
D¯u
−1
2
s
D+
dD −N
8 D¯u
0
s
D+
dD +N
8 D¯u
0
s
D+
dD
+
N
D+
D
Ω− αD¯u − pgs+ pxδ
i
(−dD¯u
dpt
) +
N
D+
D
Ω− D¯u − pts
i
(
dD¯u
dpt
)
+
N
D+
(pt − z)s(
dD¯u
dpt
) = 0
Substituting for dD¯udpt = −
1
2
s
(1−α) and on simplification yields,
dVu
dpt
= −1
2
Ns
D+
[D+ − D¯u]−
1
2
Ns
D+(1− α)(pt − z)s
−1
2
Ns
D+(1− α)
D
(1− α)D¯u − pgs+ pts+ pxδ
i
= 0
27
Since D¯u ≡ (pg−pt)s(1−α) −
pxδ
(1−α) , the last term in the above equation vanishes. Thus, we have
−[D+ − D¯u]−
(pt − z)s
(1− α) = 0
⇒ (D
+ − D¯u)(1− α)
s
= z − pt
III. Welfare Maximization under Perfect Discrimination – First-Best Regime.
The welfare maximization problem of the developing country government in this case is given
by
max
pt
Vd = N
8 D+
D¯d
p
Ω− αDi − pg(D, pt)s+ pxδ
Q
dΣ(D) +N
8 D¯d
0
p
Ω−Di − pts
Q
dΣ(D)
+N
8 D¯d
0
(pt − z)sdΣ(D)
Substituting for pg =
(1−α)D
s +
pxδ
s + pt yields,
max
pt
Vd = N
8 D+
D¯d
X
Ω−Di − pts
D+
~
dD +N
8 D¯d
0
X
Ω−Di − pts
D+
~
dD
+N
8 D¯d
0
(pt − z)s
D+
dD
The first order condition is given by
dVd
dpt
=
N
D+
D
Ω− D¯d − pts
i
(−dD¯d
dpt
) +
N
D+
D
Ω− D¯d − pts
i
(
dD¯d
dpt
)
− N
D+
s[D+ − D¯d]−
N
D+
sD¯d +
N
D+
sD¯d +
N
D+
(pt − z)s(
dD¯d
dpt
) = 0
substituting for dD¯ddpt = −
1
2
s
(1−α) yields,
(z − pt) = [D+ − D¯d]
(1− α)
s
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Table 1: Summary statistics and model results 
 
 Summary statistics 
(n = 289) 
Results of WTP model 
(n = 289) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Coefficient t-statistic 
Land owned (ha) 245.39 716.09 0.05 3.39 
Square of land owned 571,226 3,778,288 -7.4 x 10-6 -3.16 
Education (years) 6.70 3.73 2.73 2.49 
Age (years) 48.70 11.35 -0.08 -0.27 
Credit constraint (dummy) 0.77 0.42 -19.31 -2.70 
Insecticide expenditure ($/ha) 15.95 14.27 0.60 2.44 
Good soil quality (dummy) 0.25 0.43 10.00 1.45 
Price of traditional seed ($/ha) 14.40 8.72 1.46 2.74 
Constant   27.95 1.38 
Log likelihood   -189.90  
 
Figure I: Willingness to Pay for GM
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